Faculty of Arts and Humanities | University of Macau

FAH/DPHIL-IAS Philosophy Forum Distinguished Scholars Series – 4: "Living Chinese Philosophy: ‘Zoetology’ 生生論 as First Philosophy" by Prof. Roger T. Ames
2024-03-14 16:00 - 17:30 UTC | E34-G011
Abstract
The classical Greeks give us a substance ontology grounded in “being qua being” or “being per se” (to on he on) that guarantees a permanent and unchanging subject as the substratum for the human experience. With the combination of eidos and telos as the formal and final cause of independent things such as persons, this “sub-stance” necessarily persists through change. This substratum or essence includes its purpose for being, and is defining of the “what-it-means-to-be-a-thing-of-this-kind” of any particular thing in setting a closed, exclusive boundary and the strict identity necessary for it to be this, and not that.
In the Yijing 易經 or Book of Changes we find a vocabulary that makes explicit cosmological assumptions that are a stark alternative to this substance ontology, and provides the interpretive context for the Confucian canons by locating them within a holistic, organic, and ecological worldview. To provide a meaningful contrast with this fundamental assumption of on or “being” we might borrow the Greek notion of zoe or “life” and create the neologism “zoe-tology” as “the art of living.” This cosmology begins from “living” (sheng 生) itself as the motive force behind change, and gives us a world of boundless “becomings:” not “things” that are, but “events” that are happening, a contrast between an ontological conception of human “beings” and a process conception of what I will call human “becomings.”

Bio
Roger T. Ames 安樂哲 is Humanities Chair Professor at Peking University, Senior Academic Advisor of the Peking University Berggruen Research Center, and Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Hawai’i. He is former editor of Philosophy East & West and founding editor of China Review International. Ames has authored several interpretative studies of Chinese philosophy and culture: Thinking Through Confucius (1987), Anticipating China (1995), Thinking from the Han (1998), and Democracy of the Dead (1999) (all with D.L. Hall), Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (2011), and most recently Human Becomings: Theorizing ‘Persons’ for Confucian Role Ethics (2020). His publications also include translations of Chinese classics: Sun-tzu: The Art of Warfare (1993); Sun Pin: The Art of Warfare (1996) (with D.C. Lau); the Confucian Analects (1998) and the Chinese Classic of Family Reverence: The Xiaojing (2009) (both with H. Rosemont), Focusing the Familiar: The Zhongyong (2001), and The Daodejing (with D.L. Hall) (2003). Almost all of his publications are now available in Chinese translation, including his philosophical translations of Chinese canonical texts. He has most recently published the new Sourcebook in Classical Confucian Philosophy (2023) with its companion A Conceptual Lexicon for Classical Confucian Philosophy (2021), continues to write articles promoting a conversation between world pragmatism and Confucian philosophy.

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Transparency, Moore’s Paradox and the Concept of Belief " by Prof. Adam Andreotta, Curtin University, Australia
2024-04-03 17:30 - 19:00 | E21-3118 or via Zoom
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/95298043328
Password: [REDACTED]

Abstract
In this paper, I take a closer look at the relationship between belief and judgement. I argue for the output thesis—the thesis that conscious judgements give rise to occurrent beliefs. I then go on to suggest that the output thesis provides independent support for the transparency method and an independent explanation of why Moore’s Paradox arises. My view stands in contrast to views in the literature which are sceptical of there being such a close connection between judgement and belief, and also provides a challenge to those who support the transparency method by appealing to Moore’s Paradox. Along the way I discuss some of the implications of the output thesis for current characterisations of judgement and belief. Finally, I address a significant objection to the output thesis—namely, the set of cases where subjects assert that P, but behave in ways that suggest they believe not-P. I argue that such cases do not undermine the output thesis.

Bio
Professor Adam Andreotta is a Lecturer at Curtin University in Western Australia. He received his doctoral degree in Philosophy from the University of Western Australia in July 2018. ​His main research topic is the philosophy of self-knowledge—a major topic at the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of mind. His Ph.D. thesis, First-Person Authority and its Limits, defended a view of self-knowledge called the transparency method—a view which differs from traditional inward-looking accounts of introspection. He has continued to publish work on the transparency method and other topics pertaining to self-knowledge. Beyond this, he has published on the philosophy of artificial intelligence, specifically on the Ethics of Big Data and AI Rights, as well as the history of philosophy, with a keen interest in the philosophical works of David Hume.

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Affective Basis of Cognition and Reasoning in Non-human Animals" by Prof. Sanja Srećković, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany
2024-04-10 17:30 - 19:00 | E21-3118 or via Zoom
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/93537268512
Password: [REDACTED]

Abstract
The talk starts by presenting what I call ‘the two problems of animal reasoning’. The first problem concerns the mainstream understanding of reasoning in philosophy of mind and epistemology, which faces significant difficulties explaining a growing body of empirical results in animal cognition research. The second problem concerns the interpretation of the same empirical results within comparative psychology, namely, whether they are best explained by appeal to (‘lower’) associative or (‘higher’) cognitive mechanisms. Some recent developments have led to a crisis of both this practice and the distinction between the ‘associative’ and the ‘cognitive’. In response to these two problems, I develop an affect-based approach to reasoning, which broadens the conception of reasoning to include the non-human cases. I also show that affective experiences exhibit both ‘associative’ and ‘cognitive’ characteristics, further challenging the strict dichotomy between them, which might more fruitfully be replaced by a continuum.

Bio
Sanja Srećković received her Ph.D. degree in Philosophy at the University of Belgrade in 2019, where she continued working as a Research Associate. During her PhD, she was a visiting scholar at York University in Toronto, where she did research on mental representation and animal cognition. In February 2024, she won an EPSA Fellowship for a research visit to the University of Geneva, to work on philosophy of emotions and philosophy of biology. In 2024 she became a Humboldt Postdoctoral Fellow at Ruhr University Bochum, where she joined Alber Newen’s research group. Her current work combines research on mental representation, reasoning and affective experiences from a comparative and developmental perspective. The goal of her research project is to develop a framework for understanding reasoning that does not depend on linguistic capability and can include non-linguistic reasoning agents. She is also exploring the role of affective and emotional experiences in developing more abstract cognitive capacities.

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Seeing the Non-existent " by Prof. Wolfgang Barz, Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich, Germany
2024-04-24 17:30 - 19:00 | E21A-3118 & Zoom
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/95409920647
Password: [REDACTED]

Abstract
In my talk I will outline a direct-realist theory of sensory experience, i.e. a theory according to which material objects are directly given to us in sensory experience. In contrast to other versions of direct realism, however, I will not limit the scope of this claim to veridical experiences, but extend it to non-veridical cases (hallucinations, illusions, dreams) as well. The central idea of my approach is to understand non-veridical cases of sensory experience as direct awarenesses of non-existent material objects. I would like to draw on a conception of non-existent objects that was originally introduced by Alexius Meinong (1904) and later developed further by Terence Parsons (1980), Richard Routley (1980) and Dale Jacquette (1996).

Bio
Wolfgang works as a visiting professor at Ludwig-Maximilians University Munich, Germany. His core interests lie in various areas of theoretical philosophy. Currently, he is working primarily on problems of self-consciousness and self-knowledge. However, he is also interested in the structure of phenomenal concepts, the nature of non-existent objects and metaphilosophical questions, in particular the question of what makes a topic an object of philosophical research. — Earlier, Wolfgang worked at Goethe-University Frankfurt, Duisburg-Essen University, Leibniz University Hannover, Bielefeld University, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, and Freie Universität Berlin. He lives in Berlin, together with his partner and two children.

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Dialectics of Freedom in “Ode on a Grecian Urn”: Keats, Hegel, Marx" by Dr. James Chambers, Hebei University, China
2024-08-28 17:30 - 19:00 | E21A-3118
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/95244216235
Password: [REDACTED]

Abstract
“Ode on a Grecian Urn” is an attractive site for mixing John Keats, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Karl Marx because Hegel and Marx were both philhellenes. In Hegel and Marx, the concepts of truth and beauty intertwine with the concept of freedom. Dialectical aesthetics defines beauty in terms of truth and defines art’s truth in terms of freedom. This article’s Hegelian interpretation is oriented around subjectivity and transcendence of freedom. Its Marxian interpretation is oriented around historicity and the immanence of freedom. The “negative capability” of the ode abolishes and uplifts the best of Hegelian and Marxian interpretation in aesthetic wonder with mystery.

Bio
Dr. James Chambers teaches philosophy at Hebei University. His area of research is the philosophy of Hegel, Marx, and Laozi and interdisciplinary studies of philosophy, literature and history. His recent publications include the book Marx and Laozi: A Dialectical Synthesis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), and articles; “Dialectics of Freedom in “Ode on a Grecian Urn”: Keats, Hegel, Marx” (Clio: A Journal of Literature, History, and the Philosophy of History, 2023), “Hegel’s Metaphilosophy of Idealism” (Metaphilosophy, 2021), “Didactic Mimesis in Wordsworth’s ‘Simon Lee’” (Style, 2020; co-authored with Sun Shuting), and “Against Methodological Individualist Interpretation of Marxist Explanations of Social Phenomena” (International Critical Thought, 2018; co-authored with Cheng Zhihua). James is currently completing the first draft of a historical novel, writing an article on Hegel’s epistemology on the question of the relationship between representations and concepts, and working with East China Normal University Press Ltd. on a Chinese translation of his book.

Philosophy Forum: Distinguished Scholars Series - 5: "Human Agency and Human Sacrifice: A Neo-Tiantai Perspective" by Prof. Brook Ziporyn, The University of Chicago, U.S.A.
2024-08-29 14:00 - 16:00 | UM Gallery Auditorium (E1-B1002)

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Fearing Climate-Fictions: Emotions, Persuasion, and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Cli-Fi" by Dr. Marta Benenti, University of Murcia, Spain
2024-09-11 17:30 - 19:00 | E21A-3118
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/99087478661
Password: [REDACTED]

Abstract
Most literary and cinematographic narratives about climate change depict catastrophic scenarios which have a tragic impact on the stories’ characters and frequently lead to hopeless endings (Trexler 2015). Owing much to dystopian literature, such cultural products as Cli-fi (or climate fictions) present their audiences with scary, shocking, or threatening images of more or less near futures (Benenti & Giombini 2023). As a consequence, narrative engagement with these works is often accompanied by feelings of discomfort, anxiety, and fear. While these emotional states can be thought to contribute to Cli-fi’s capacity to raise recipients’ awareness concerning the environmental crisis, empirical evidence suggests that negative emotions impair rather than foster climate-friendly behaviours (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole 2009). In this talk, I (i) review the psychological literature concerning the effects of negative emotions elicited by narratives on action dispositions; (ii) introduce the hypothesis that catastrophic narratives are less likely than more positive accounts of climate change to motivate people’s engagement; (iii) suggest that the aesthetic appreciation of Cli-fi works – rather than the positive or negative valence of the emotions aroused – is crucial in determining readers’ and watchers’ disposition to actively counter climate change.

Bio
Marta Benenti received her PhD in philosophy at the University of Turin. She’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Murcia, where she carries out the project LEAP – Learning to Appreciate Aesthetic Values. Previously, she held research positions at the Italian Academy (New York), the University of Turin, and the San Raffaele University (Milan), and teaching positions at the Politecnico of Turin. From 2021 to 2023 she was postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Eastern Piedmont where she taught aesthetics and philosophy of mind, while working on a project on the persuasive power of fictional narratives about climate change. She has published on the topics of expressiveness, emotions, the aesthetics of tourism, fiction, and the perception of aesthetic values.

Philosophy Forum: Distinguished Scholars Series - 6: "Reshaping Confucianism" by Prof. Chenyang Li, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
2024-09-23 16:00 - 17:30 | E34-G011

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – "Plato and Plato’s Socrates on Mythmaking" by Prof. Chloe Balla, University of Crete, Greece
2024-09-25 17:30 - 19:00 | E21A-3118
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/95701738202
Password: [REDACTED]

Abstract
Writing in the 1st century BCE, the Roman scholar Cicero claimed that Socrates brought philosophy down from the heavens. Cicero’s claim ties in with Xenophon’s representation of his teacher, according to which Socrates advised his students to abstain from the study of nature and instead focused on their ethical cultivation. Xenophon also attributes to Socrates the groundbreaking idea of a divine Demiurge, a Craftsman who designed the world, including of course human beings. Plato, on the other hand, who is the most famous of Socrates’ students, presents his teacher not as the author but rather as a listener of a creation story that was recounted to him by Timaeus, an otherwise unknown philosopher and statesman, reported in the later tradition as a Pythagorean. Timaeus’ teleological account of nature is often considered as an answer to the concern Plato’s Socrates expresses on the last day of his life (recounted in the Phaedo), regarding the failure of contemporary physics to grant intelligence the causal role he thinks it should play in the cosmos. Plato, however, is aware that the ambitious account of nature his teacher envisaged cannot be cast in the language of an argument (a logos: the term can be translated as speech, but also argument or reasoning) but rather of a story (in the vocabulary of the Timaeus an eikos mythos: a likely account or myth).
With this background in mind, I propose to offer a new interpretation of Socrates’ claim in the beginning of the Phaedo according to which he was not an expert in myth-making. I propose to draw attention to the contrast between (a) Socrates’ claim concerning his own lack of expertise in myth-making and (b) the mythological account that toward the end of the dialogue, he attributes to an unnamed informant. Following David Sedley, I propose to argue that the unnamed informant Socrates invokes is Plato himself, who envisages and offers to his teacher, albeit in mythical language, a ‘preview’ of the teleological account that in a later dialogue he attributes to Timaeus. Based on Sedley’s hypothesis, I go on to suggest that the author Plato intends Socrates’ claim in the beginning of the dialogue, concerning his lack of expertise in mythmaking, as a statement of the contrast but also the continuity between the teacher Socrates (who envisaged a teleological account of nature, but lacked the tools that would allow him to develop it, which included the art of mythmaking) and the student Plato, who successfully fulfilled Socrates’ dream and developed an original vision concerning natural science.

Bio
Chloe Balla is a professor of ancient philosophy at the University of Crete, Director of the Philosophical Research and Translation Lab, UCRC, and Secretary of the Centre of Greek and Chinese Ancient Civilizations (KELKIP). She has published extensively on the Sophists, the Hippocratic Corpus and Plato’s dialogues. She is the author of Platonic Persuasion: From Rhetoric to Statecraft (Athens 1997, in Greek) and The Sophists and Socrates (Athens 2023, co-authored with Kalliopi Papamanoli), and of a Modern Greek translation of Aristotle’s Constitution of the Athenians (Athens 2015), and co-editor of Plato’s Academy. Its Workings and Its History (Cambridge University Press, 2020), and Deaths of Philosophers in Antiquity (Athens, 2010). She has been a fellow at the Center for Hellenic Studies (Harvard University), the Seeger Center for Hellenic Studies (Princeton University) and at the Israel Institute for Advanced Studies.

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – "In Defense of Social Hierarchies in China" by Prof. Daniel Bell and Prof. Wang Pei, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
2024-10-09 17:30 - 19:00 | E21A-3118
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/93780921652
Password: [REDACTED]

Abstract
Any modern society needs social hierarchies. We know which ones are unjust — based on race, sex, and class — but which ones are just? Wang Pei and Daniel Bell will draw on their book Just Hierarchy (Princeton University Press, 2022) to argue that morally justified hierarchies benefit not just those with power, but also those on the bottom of social hierarchies. They will illustrate this argument by drawing on examples of social hierarchies in contemporary China, from age-based hierarchies in the family to drinking banquets in academic settings and hierarchical relations between countries. The point is not to defend the status quo but to show how it can be improved by means of just hierarchies. Their talk will engage with such critics as Hans Georg Moeller and Lee Ting-mien.

Bio
Daniel A. Bell (貝淡寧) is Professor, Chair of Political Theory with the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong. He served as Dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University (Qingdao) from 2017 to 2022. His books include The Dean of Shandong (2023), Just Hierarchy (co-authored with Wang Pei, 2020), The China Model (2015), The Spirit of Cities (co-authored with Avner de-Shalit, 2012), China’s New Confucianism (2008), Beyond Liberal Democracy (2007), and East Meets West (2000), all published by Princeton University Press. He is also the author of Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford University Press, 1993). He is founding editor of the Princeton-China series (Princeton University Press) which translates and publishes original and influential academic works from China. His works have been translated in 23 languages. He has been interviewed in English, Chinese, and French. In 2018, he was awarded the Huilin Prize and was honored as a “Cultural Leader” by the World Economic Forum.

Wang Pei is an assistant professor at the School of Chinese, the University of Hong Kong. She completed her PhD thesis on phenomenology at department of philosophy of Tsinghua University and was a joint PhD. student in Université Paris 1. She was a post-doctoral research fellow in Tsinghua Institute of Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Science. She is the co-author (with Daniel. A. Bell) of Just Hierarchy: Why Social Hierarchies Matter in China and the Rest of the World, published by Princeton University Press in 2020. She has authored over thirty academic articles in English, Chinese, and French, mainly on phenomenology, Jungian psychology and comparative philosophy. She is currently writing a book titled “The Power of Calligraphy: A Political History of Calligraphy in China.”.

FAH/DPHIL: MRI International Symposium 2024 - "Cultural Exchange between China and the West: Remembering Marco Polo"
2024-10-18 - 2024-10-19 | Auditorium, University Gallery (E1)
The travels of Marco Polo symbolise a rich tradition of cultural encounter between China and the West. On the 7th centenary of his death, this Symposium celebrates Marco Polo’s legacy by investigating the multi-faceted cultural exchange that took place along the Silk Roads and maritime trade routes connecting China and the West from the 13th century to the present day. Throughout much of this time, the city of Macao played a pivotal role in the story of mutual discovery that unfolded through the exchange of knowledge, objects, and insights in the domains of science, religion, education, and the arts. Macao still bears the imprint of centuries of intense cultural engagement. In addition to talks and discussions highlighting the intertwined histories of China and the West negotiated through the exchange of cultural goods, this Symposium provides an opportunity for a guided tour of Macao’s historical centre. It also includes a cultural event that reflects Macao’s intricate cultural identity and global significance.

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – "Universal Love (jian’ai) and not Loving Robbers" by Prof. Yun Wu, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
2024-10-23 17:30 - 19:00 | E21A-3118
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/93356482056
Password: [REDACTED]

Abstract
The claim “although robbers are people, loving robbers is not loving people” in the Mohist Canons at first glance seems to contradict their doctrine of “jian’ai”, which is supposed to be all-inclusive. This paper explains why it does not. On the interpretation I shall propose, jian’ai is not merely proposed by the Mohists as a moral goal, but also as a side-constraint—in the sense that its minimum requirement “not to harm the innocent” serves as a moral constraint set upon all actions, including the endeavor to realize the moral goal jian’ai itself. This side-constraint makes sure that jian’ai in any case is not pursued at the cost of defeating itself.
Since “not to harm the innocent” works as the side-constraint, and robbers by definition in the Mohist texts are those who intentionally harm the innocent, the claim of opposing robbers (more concretely in the text “not loving robbers” and “punishing robbers”)—their maxim and actions—can then be understood as an equivalent articulation of the side-constraint. It thus does not contradict jian’ai, but rather sustains its logical consistency.

Bio
Yun Wu received her Bachelor degree of Philosophy from Wuhan University, and both her Master and Doctoral degrees of Philosophy from Tsinghua University in Beijing. She has joined Shanghai Jiao Tong University since 2012 and is now a professor at the Department of Philosophy. Her recent academic visiting experience includes one year at St. Antony’s College in Oxford (2021-2022), and one year at UC Berkeley’s Department of Philosophy (2016-2017).
Her academic interests focus on moral and political philosophy, Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy. She has published several papers on Mohism in recent years, with a critical reflection on ingrained and still popular views such as that Mohism is a form of consequentialism (or more particularly, utilitarianism), that the Mohist idea of “jian’ai” equals to “love without distinctions”, that the Mohist political theory promotes a kind of “despotism”, and other views.

FAH/DPHIL: The Mario Echano Prize for the Best Undergraduate Philosophy Essay
2024-10-31 - 2025-05-02
The Mario Echano Prize for the Best Undergraduate Philosophy Essay is awarded for excellence in philosophy. Students enrolled in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies undergraduate courses are eligible to enter an essay for the annual award.
Students are invited to submit an academic essay written as an assignment in one of the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies’ undergraduate courses this academic year (AY2024/2025). Essays of any length are acceptable. The organisers reserve the right not to award the prize if essays are not of sufficiently high standard.
Please submit essays by e-mail with the subject line ‘Submission for the Mario Echano Prize’ to Maggie Wong at MaggieWong@um.edu.mo. Attach your essay to the message as a Microsoft Word document (other formats will not be accepted). Please give your name, student number, and the name of the course for which you wrote the essay, on the first page of the essay. The deadline for submission is Friday, 2nd May 2025.
We look forward to your submissions.

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – "Reaching Addicted Minds" by Dr. Daniel Morgan, University of York, United Kingdom
2024-11-06 17:30 - 19:00 | E21A-3118
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/96566927288
Password: [REDACTED]

Abstract
One approach to the question of why addiction excuses is to focus on the question of what addiction is. In this presentation, I take a different approach, focusing on the question of what excuses are. I argued that excuses are considerations that block inferences to a morally deficient psychology. It falls out of this view of what excuses are that a relatively surface-level property of addiction – the fact when one is addicted to something, one is highly motivated by it – is sufficient to explain why addiction excuses. The view about excuses also supports a diagnosis of why the point about motivation can seem insufficient to explain why addiction excuses. Central to the diagnosis is a fact about non-addicts: non-addicts typically underestimate how motivating objects of addiction are to addicts, thought ignorance of some of the mechanisms by which those objects motivate.

Bio
Dr. Daniel Morgan received his UG, BPhil and DPhil from the University of Oxford. He had post-docs at Oxford, University College London, and the University of Barcelona, and is presently a lecturer at the University of York. He is interested in Mind, Epistemology, and Moral Psychology. His PhD and postdoctoral work looked at issues at the nature and role of perspectival thought (e.g. thought about a time ‘as now’, thought about a person ‘as me’). More recently he has been interested in moral responsibility, including especially the nature of excuses in general and addiction in particular. He has a paper forthcoming on excuses in Free and Equal, and on spontaneous freedom in Ethics.

FAH/DPHIL: Philosophy Café
2024-11-20 15:00 - 16:30 | E21-G049

FAH/DPHIL: 4th International Conference on Natural Cognition - "Deception: Self, Others, and the Digital World"
2024-11-22 - 2024-11-23 | Auditorium, University Gallery (E1)
Conference website: https://naturalcognition2024.wixsite.com/academic-conference

FAH/DPHIL Conference: "Laozi's Philosophy - Heng Dao and Temporality"
2024-11-23 - 2024-11-24 | E21A-G035 / E21A-3118

FAH/DPHIL Workshop: 儒家倫理與現代性工作坊
2024-12-07 | E21A-3118

UM Distinguished Visiting Scholar Series – "Why Does Ritual Matter?: Theories from Classical China" by Prof. Michael Puett, Harvard University, USA
2025-01-10 17:30 - 19:00 | E21-G035

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – "How Belief Functions" by Dr. Ema Sullivan-Bissett, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom
2025-01-15 17:30 - 19:00 | E21-3118
Link: https://go.um.edu.mo/eds02x2h

Abstract
Our beliefs shape our understanding of the world and are key to how successful we are interacting with it. Fortunately, most of our beliefs get things (at least roughly) right, perhaps because they are constrained by evidence and not under our voluntary control. But sometimes we go wrong. We are overly optimistic, we engage in self-deception, we fail to properly update beliefs we hold dear in response to evidence, and, in perhaps the most paradigmatic case of belief gone wrong, we become deluded. How can we explain what belief is and how it behaves when faced with such a range of cases? In this talk, I argue that if we want our account of belief to be explanatorily adequate, we should separate the modal question concerning the nature of belief across possible worlds, from a more local question concerning the manifestation of its various guises in the actual world. I propose that what is necessary to belief is its motivational role, and it is this which sets the boundaries of the class of beliefs. But this unifying feature is not where our explanatory gains lie. Rather, the contingent biological circumstances of belief’s manifestation in the actual world is where we find explanations of the behaviour of garden variety beliefs, as well as the resources to accommodate various bad beliefs. If we want to explain its various operations, we must focus on how belief functions.

Bio
Ema Sullivan-Bissett is a Reader in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham. Her research concerns the nature of belief and its connection to truth, as well as delusional belief formation and implicit bias. She has recently been the Principal Investigator of two research projects: Deluded by Experience (funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council), and Conspiratorial Ideation and Pathological Belief (funded by the British Academy). She is the editor of Art and Belief (Oxford University Press, 2017), Belief, Imagination, and Delusion (Oxford University Press, 2024), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion (Routledge, 2024), and the author of Irrationality (Cambridge University Press, 2025). She has also published in the British Journal of Aesthetics, Erkenntnis, European Journal of Philosophy, Mind & Language, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophical Studies, Synthese, and others.

UM Distinguished Visiting Scholar Series – "Humans and Gods: The Theme of Self-Divinization in Early China and Early Greece" by Prof. Michael Puett, Harvard University, USA
2025-01-17 17:30 - 19:00 | E21-3118

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – "Fake News and the Dark Side of Speech" by Prof. Carlo Penco, University of Murcia, Spain
2025-02-12 17:30 - 19:00 | E21-3118
Microsoft Teams: https://go.um.edu.mo/w7j1ioud

Abstract
In the talk, I will discuss the topic of disinformation, starting with the different approaches taken by the United States and Europe to the notion of free speech. After discussing problems that connect free speech with disinformation and fake news, I will use some basic tools in the philosophy of language to give some clarification of the notion of fake news. First of all, I will use Austin’s notion of speech act, and in particular, I will describe fake news as a kind of speech act falling under the force of assertion. I then will treat some aspects of pragmatics dealing with the idea of common ground (Robert Stalnaker) and accommodation (David Lewis). Through these notions, I will illustrate with examples how hidden presuppositions can persuade people implicitly, leading them to easily believe fake news. If there is time, I will conclude on the problem of the relation between fake news and belief: do people believe in fake news? And if yes, why?
Bio
After studying in Oxford with Sir Michael Dummett, Professor Penco taught philosophy of science at the University of Salento (1988–1992) and then became a full professor of philosophy of language at the University of Genoa, where he was head of the master’s in philosophy and of the doctorate in philosophy. he edited many volumes and collections of classical and contemporary philosophers (Gottlob Frege, John L. Austin, Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, Saul Kripke, David Kaplan, John Perry, and others) and published in many philosophical journals such as Philosophia, Philosophical Investigations, and Theoria. He co-organized many international conferences, including conferences on modeling and using contexts, a venue for interdisciplinary research with computer scientists, philosophers, and other social science experts. He was a visiting scholar at various institutions, such as the Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science and London’s Institute of Philosophy. Among his main works are an introduction to the philosophy of language and a book on disinformation, The Dark Side of Speech.

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – "Diverse Fates in Homer" by Prof. Hao Chunpeng, Shanghai Normal University, China
2025-03-12 17:30 - 19:00 | E21A-3118
Microsoft Teams: https://go.um.edu.mo/soiigfgx

Abstract
How does fate play out in Homer’s epics? Were Hektor’s and Achiles’s ends predestined? Do ordinary humans have any control over their lives, or do gods direct their plans? And does Zeus always have the final say? Fate is usually understood as the unknowable will of a supernatural power controlling all events in human life. In Homer, fate is a highly diverse notion, reflecting the hierarchical structure that defines the relationships between Zeus, other gods, heroes, and ordinary people. In what follows we look at how this structure plays out in the unfolding of events in the exciting Homeric universe.

Bio
Chunpeng Hao is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Shanghai Normal University. He obtained his B.A. in Administration from Hebei University of Economics and Business in 2005, Ph.M. in Western Philosophy from Hainan University in 2009, and Ph.D. in Western Philosophy from Fudan University in 2014 with a dissertation on “Raymond Aron and the Philosophy of History”. He was a visiting scholar at Boston College (2017.12-2018.12) and Université de Paris-Ouest-Nanterre-La Defense (2012.12-2013.4).
His research focuses on Philosophy of History, Political Philosophy, and French Philosophy. He has published books such as “A Companion to Utopia” (2022) and “Understanding and Construction: Raymond Aron’s Philosophy of History” (2021), and articles in refereed journals like “Diverse Fates in Homer” in Philosophy and Literature (2024).

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – "Spiritual-Based Values at the Cultural Crossroads" by Prof. Dan Chițoiu, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, Romania
2025-03-14 15:30 - 17:00 | E21A-3118
Microsoft Teams: https://go.um.edu.mo/3w6maslx

Abstract
In an increasingly interconnected world, the intersection of diverse cultures has become a rich ground for exchanging ideas, traditions, and values. At the heart of this cultural crossroads lies the potential for spiritual-based values to go beyond geographical, linguistic, and ideological boundaries. These values emerge from religious traditions, philosophical inquiry, or personal spiritual practices and experiences. Spiritual-based values are those principles and codes that arise from an awareness of the interconnectedness of all aspects of life, a multimillennial wisdom. Such values, rooted in the deeper dimensions of human existence, offer a framework for harmony in a world marked by division and conflict. Yet, while the potential of spiritual-based values is great, their integration into the cultural crossroads is not without challenges.

Bio
Dan Chițoiu is Professor of Philosophy at Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, Romania. Founder of the Institute for the Study of Values and Spirituality with John Farina. Director of the Iași Center of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (Washington DC). Editor of the Journal for Research in Values and Spirituality. Former Research Coordinator at the Romanian Academy-Iași Branch. Founding and organizing with Dr. Constantinos Athanasopoulos (FHEA, UK/Greece) the St Gregory Palamas Seminar: International Research into the Philosophical and Theological Work of St Gregory Palamas. His research interests are in Eastern European Spirituality and Philosophy, Intercultural Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy. He has attended conferences, lectured, and/or has been published in many countries, including the United States, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, Portugal, Turkey, Lebanon, Russia, China, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, Argentina, and Australia. His most recent publications include Philosophizing in the Christian East; Founding Ideas of the Eastern-European Cultural Horizon; Person, World, Ultimate Reality and Faces and Sur-faces: A Phenomenology of Intercultural Encounters.

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – "Reason With Multiple Exemplars" by Prof. Xinkan Zhao, Peking University, China
2025-03-26 17:30 - 19:00 | E21A-3118
Microsoft Teams: https://go.um.edu.mo/8aa0b7f1

Abstract
Suppose some form of idealization- and desire-based thesis of internalism about reasons is true, that an agent has reason to φ if and only if the ideal counterpart of the agent has a desire appropriately related to φ-ing. Questions then arise concerning how best to flesh out the thesis and what follows from it when properly understood. In this talk, I take up these questions. More specifically, I first engage with the well-known debate between two ways of understanding the thesis, namely, to treat the counterpart as an exemplar or an advisor, and make a case for a revised version of the exemplar model. Then I critically examine Eric Sampson’s recent challenge that internalism faces foundational difficulties because an agent may have multiple fully rational counterparts. I argue that we should follow Sampson in thinking that internalism should take the form of having multiple exemplars, but that the difficulties he raises rest on mistaken assumptions and therefore do not post a real threat. I go on to work out some of the theoretical consequences of internalism so understood, but remain neutral on whether they count in favor of or against the theory.

Bio
Professor Xinkan Zhao is an assistant professor in philosophy at Peking University, working primarily on normativity and metaethics. He is particularly interested in questions like whether normative facts can be identified with naturalistic facts, whether they are relativized (and if so, how), how various normative systems are related, the extent to which moral rationalism is true, among others. His most recent research focus revolves around theories that can be broadly categorized as constructivism about reasons, which he takes to be the best if not only hope of escaping the grip of error theory. Apart from normativity and metaethics, he takes an interest in metaphysics, including mainstream topics in the analytic tradition, and in comparative philosophy, with the hope that the native Chinese philosophical tradition receives the attention that it deserves in academia. His piecemeal thoughts have appeared in journals such as Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Synthese, and Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy.

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – "Mental Minutiae: On the Residues, Fragments, Remnants, and Seeds of Mental Life" by Prof. Benjamin Winokur, University of Macau
2025-04-09 17:30 - 19:00 | E21A-3118
Microsoft Teams: https://go.um.edu.mo/wnp200k4

Abstract
We often refer to the remnants, fragments, and seeds of physical objects in everyday life: the remnants of a fallen building or exploded firecracker, a fragment from a chipped mug, or the seed of an acorn tree. In referring to these, we find nothing of obvious metaphysical difficulty; adequately conceptualizing these items seems to require just basic object concepts, and basic representations of the mereological and temporal relations in which they stand. But what about the remnants or residues of mental phenomena? Here we do confront a metaphysically difficult question, namely whether such mental minutiae exist at all. I first introduce the concept of mental minutiae, contrasting them with “minimally complete” mental phenomena that are not the mere remnants, fragments, or residues of larger mental phenomena. Second, I argue that mental minutiae may be of explanatory use in long-standing philosophical debates about first-person authority and implicit bias. I conclude with some methodological remarks about how to best to ascribe mental minutiae to one another, given their conceptual unfamiliarity from the standpoint of ordinary folk psychology.

Bio
Professor Benjamin Winokur is an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of Macau. He works primarly on topics in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of mind, such as self-knowledge, first-person authority, the nature of belief, digital epistemology, the epistemology of inquiry, and “hostile” epistemology. He has published papers in peer-reviewed journals such as Synthese, The European Journal of Philosophy, Inquiry, Philosophical Psychology, Dialectica, Episteme, and elsewhere. He is also the co-editor, alongside Adam Andreotta, of “New Perspectives on Transparency and Self-Knowledge”, published with Routledge in 2025. Finally, he is the author of a book in progress titled “Knowing Where You Stand: Essays on the Value of Reflective Commitment”, under contract with Routledge.

FAH/DPHIL Conference: 中國形上學傳統中的「物」
2025-04-12 - 2025-04-13 | E21A-3118

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – "Daoist Wisdom: An Account of Epistemic Humility" by Dr. Christine Tan, Yale-NUS College, Singapore
2025-04-23 17:30 - 19:00 | E21A-3118
Microsoft Teams: https://go.um.edu.mo/4sjk6f1d

Abstract
This work draws from Daoist thought to argue that epistemic humility is not only a necessary pre-condition to wisdom but is also sufficiently constitutive of wisdom. Additionally, I argue that going beyond that sufficiency undermines the genuineness of said wisdom. More specifically, both Zhuangzi and Laozi argue that going beyond epistemic humility assumes a context-transcending truth, epistemic justification, or metanormative value which exists, and can be known. In contrast, genuine wisdom understands that no knowledge, truth, or epistemic claim transcends any given context.
I advance three central arguments: First, epistemic humility is incompatible with holding any “belief,” “knowledge,” or “understanding” that is taken to be epistemically justifiable or rational. Second, epistemic humility is sufficient, and more radically, necessarily sufficient, meaning that anything added to it undermines it. Third, epistemic humility necessitates, rather than prevents, engagement and action.

Bio
Dr Christine Tan is a Filipino-born philosopher whose main areas of expertise are Chinese and Comparative Philosophy in general, and Neo-Daoist philosophy in particular. Before joining Yale-NUS College, she did her PhD at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, where she wrote her dissertation titled ‘Freedom as Self-realisation: Zide in the Neo-Daoist Philosophy of Guo Xiang’. Before that, she did her MA and BA at the University of Santo Tomas, Philippines, where her areas of focus were psychoanalysis and post-structuralist philosophy.
Dr Tan has published extensively in Chinese philosophy (with a specific focus on Guo Xiang). Her work has spanned a variety of epistemological themes from classical and medieval Chinese textual analysis to problem-driven treatments of traditionally Euro-centric issues such as freedom and autonomy. This includes published journal articles on Chinese Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism. Ultimately, her goal is to push the boundaries for how we understand selfhood, agency, and community from inter-cultural and truly global lenses.

FAH/DPHIL Work-in-progress Seminar - "Collaborating on Interdisciplinary Research: A Case Study in Philosophy & Neurolinguistics" by Mr. Kun Chan Wa
2025-08-20 17:30 - 19:00 | E21a-3121
Microsoft Teams: https://go.um.edu.mo/hk0d76q5

Abstract
This presentation is based on a co-authored paper developed through collaboration between philosophers and neurolinguists, exploring the “pursuitworthiness” of experiments in neurolinguistics. The paper investigates whether criteria for pursuitworthiness can be established for experiments in this field and, if so, which factors are most relevant. Drawing on a detailed analysis of research practices and case studies, we propose that pursuitworthiness in this domain should be evaluated along two dimensions: methodological and pragmatic.

In my talk, I will briefly outline the paper’s main argument and, more importantly, reflect on my own role in the project and on the collaborative process. I will discuss how I became involved, the specific contributions I made, and what I learned from working across disciplinary boundaries. By sharing both the substantive outcomes and the behind-the-scenes experience, I aim to show how doctoral students in philosophy can participate in and benefit from collaborative, interdisciplinary research.

Bio
Kun Chan Wa (Kun) is a PHD student in the Department of Philosophy and Religions Studies at the University of Macau. He graduated from University of Saint Joseph with a master’s degree in philosophy, and his research area was on the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Currently, he is researching the philosophy of causation and philosophy of medicine under the supervision of Professor Nevia Dolcini.

FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – "Immortality and Human Enhancements From Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 Perspective" by Prof. Jenny Hung, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong
2025-08-27 17:30 - 19:00 | E21A-G049
Microsoft Teams: https://go.um.edu.mo/7pucrfsx

Abstract
The questions of the value of life and the pursuit of immortality have long intrigued philosophers. Recently, with advancements in technology aimed at enhancing human life expectancy, immortality has emerged as a significant topic of discussion. Central to transhumanist philosophy, it represents a radical transformation of human existence driven by scientific and technological progress. Human enhancements—biomedical interventions designed to improve human functioning beyond mere health restoration—are seen as powerful tools for achieving longevity. These enhancements involve biological alterations through pharmaceutical, surgical, or genetic methods.
In this paper, I explore how ZHU Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), a prominent figure in Neo-Confucianism, would approach the concepts of immortality and human enhancements. I argue that Zhu would likely endorse the pursuit of immortality, provided that such enhancements maintain, or enhance, our ability to act in accordance with moral principles. This analysis seeks to bridge traditional philosophical perspectives with contemporary discussions on the implications of human enhancement technologies.

Bio
Jenny Hung is an assistant professor of philosophy at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. She has two PhDs, one in philosophy, another in nanophysics. She investigates the nature of the self from both the Western and Eastern perspectives, aiming to answer the most fundamental questions of human existence, such as: “What are we?” “How do we persist?” She published in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophy East and West, Dao, Asian Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Logic, etc. She is now working on two books: Between Buddha-nature and Emptiness: The Peak Era of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy (Oxford University Press) and What am I? Personal Ontology in Chinese Philosophy (under review).
