Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/95562460083 Abstract According to Nietzsche the primordial form of morality was that of the "Sittlichkeit der Sitte" - a morality of custom - which has come to be overlaid for us with a morality of rules. How and why has this process taken place? Is there still room for and perhaps even a necessity for the morality of custom? Should we think of Confucian and Aristoetlian ethics, in particular, as designed to preserve elements of the morality of custom?

Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/95284746257 Abstract A major source of scientific skepticism about free will is the belief that conscious decisions and intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions. I present three serious problems encountered by any attempt to justify this belief by appealing to existing neuroscientific data. Experiments using three different kinds of technology are discussed: EEG, fMRI, and depth electrodes. I focus on three questions: When are decisions made (or intentions acquired) in the experiments at issue? When, in these experiments, is the point of no return reached for the featured overt actions? And can we properly generalize from the experimenters’ alleged findings to all decisions?