Calendar of Events
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1 event,
FAH/DPHIL: The Mario Echano Prize for the Best Undergraduate Philosophy Essay
The Mario Echano Prize for the Best Undergraduate Philosophy Essay is awarded for excellence in philosophy. Students enrolled in Philosophy and Religious Studies Department undergraduate courses are eligible to enter an essay for the annual award. Students are invited to submit an academic essay written as an assignment in one of the Philosophy and Religious Studies Department’s undergraduate courses this academic year. Essays of any length are acceptable. The organisers reserve the right not to award the prize if essays are not of sufficiently high standard. Please submit essays by e-mail with the subject line ‘Submission for the Mario Echano Prize’ to Maggie Wong at MaggieWong@um.edu.mo. Attach your essay to the message as a Microsoft Word document (other formats will not be […]
2 events,
FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “The morality of custom and the morality of rules” by Prof. Hans Sluga, University of California at Berkeley, USA
FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “The morality of custom and the morality of rules” by Prof. Hans Sluga, University of California at Berkeley, USA
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/95562460083 Abstract According to Nietzsche the primordial form of morality was that of the "Sittlichkeit der Sitte" - a morality of custom - which has come to be overlaid for us with a morality of rules. How and why has this process taken place? Is there still room for and perhaps even a necessity for the morality of custom? Should we think of Confucian and Aristoetlian ethics, in particular, as designed to preserve elements of the morality of custom?
2 events,
3 events,
FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Free Will and Neuroscience” by Prof. Alfred Mele, Florida State University, U.S.A.
FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Free Will and Neuroscience” by Prof. Alfred Mele, Florida State University, U.S.A.
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/95284746257 Abstract A major source of scientific skepticism about free will is the belief that conscious decisions and intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions. I present three serious problems encountered by any attempt to justify this belief by appealing to existing neuroscientific data. Experiments using three different kinds of technology are discussed: EEG, fMRI, and depth electrodes. I focus on three questions: When are decisions made (or intentions acquired) in the experiments at issue? When, in these experiments, is the point of no return reached for the featured overt actions? And can we properly generalize from the experimenters’ alleged findings to all decisions?