Calendar of Events
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1 event,
FAH/DPHIL: The Mario Echano Prize for the Best Undergraduate Philosophy Essay
The Mario Echano Prize for the Best Undergraduate Philosophy Essay is awarded for excellence in philosophy. Students enrolled in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies undergraduate courses are eligible to enter an essay for the annual award. Students are invited to submit an academic essay written as an assignment in one of the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies’ undergraduate courses this academic year (AY2023/2024). Essays of any length are acceptable. The organisers reserve the right not to award the prize if essays are not of sufficiently high standard. Please submit essays by e-mail with the subject line ‘Submission for the Mario Echano Prize’ to Maggie Wong at MaggieWong@um.edu.mo. Attach your essay to the message as a Microsoft Word document (other […]
2 events,
FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Transparency, Moore’s Paradox and the Concept of Belief ” by Prof. Adam Andreotta, Curtin University, Australia
FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Transparency, Moore’s Paradox and the Concept of Belief ” by Prof. Adam Andreotta, Curtin University, Australia
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/95298043328 Password: 568626 Abstract In this paper, I take a closer look at the relationship between belief and judgement. I argue for the output thesis—the thesis that conscious judgements give rise to occurrent beliefs. I then go on to suggest that the output thesis provides independent support for the transparency method and an independent explanation of why Moore’s Paradox arises. My view stands in contrast to views in the literature which are sceptical of there being such a close connection between judgement and belief, and also provides a challenge to those who support the transparency method by appealing to Moore’s Paradox. Along the way I discuss some of the implications of the output thesis for current characterisations of […]
2 events,
FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Affective Basis of Cognition and Reasoning in Non-human Animals” by Prof. Sanja Srećković, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany
FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Affective Basis of Cognition and Reasoning in Non-human Animals” by Prof. Sanja Srećković, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/93537268512 Password: 437792 Abstract The talk starts by presenting what I call ‘the two problems of animal reasoning’. The first problem concerns the mainstream understanding of reasoning in philosophy of mind and epistemology, which faces significant difficulties explaining a growing body of empirical results in animal cognition research. The second problem concerns the interpretation of the same empirical results within comparative psychology, namely, whether they are best explained by appeal to (‘lower’) associative or (‘higher’) cognitive mechanisms. Some recent developments have led to a crisis of both this practice and the distinction between the ‘associative’ and the ‘cognitive’. In response to these two problems, I develop an affect-based approach to reasoning, which broadens the conception of reasoning to include […]
2 events,
FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Seeing the Non-existent ” by Prof. Wolfgang Barz, Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich, Germany
FAH/DPHIL Lecture Series – “Seeing the Non-existent ” by Prof. Wolfgang Barz, Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich, Germany
Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/95409920647 Password: 651054 Abstract In my talk I will outline a direct-realist theory of sensory experience, i.e. a theory according to which material objects are directly given to us in sensory experience. In contrast to other versions of direct realism, however, I will not limit the scope of this claim to veridical experiences, but extend it to non-veridical cases (hallucinations, illusions, dreams) as well. The central idea of my approach is to understand non-veridical cases of sensory experience as direct awarenesses of non-existent material objects. I would like to draw on a conception of non-existent objects that was originally introduced by Alexius Meinong (1904) and later developed further by Terence Parsons (1980), Richard Routley (1980) and Dale Jacquette […]