Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/91382186744 Password: 990533   Abstract This paper argues that there is a form of philosophical expertise that has to do with the acquisition of philosophical intuitions. In other words, there are at least some cases in which having “genuine” philosophical intuitions (i.e. philosophical intuitions that are based on the full possession of relevant concepts) requires some form of philosophical expertise; laypeople without philosophical expertise do not have genuine philosophical intuitions. As a case study, we focus on the intuitions about free will and determinism, and provide experimental evidence that philosophical expertise is necessary in order to have genuine philosophical intuitions about free will and determinism.   Bio Kengo Miyazono is an associate professor of philosophy at Hokkaido University, Japan. […]

Zoom: https://umac.zoom.us/j/98345879594 Password: 821200   Abstract Philosophers often raise the objection that Cassirer’s theory of myth appears unequipped to account for the possibility of the return of mythical consciousness within modern Western societies. I argue that Cassirer’s philosophy of myth can successfully respond to this classical objection. In his second volume, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 2: The Mythical Thinking, Cassirer draws on Schelling’s philosophy of myth in order to give a transcendental account of mythical experience. Like Schelling, Cassirer argues that myth is historically overcome by other forms of culture, such as revealed religion and scientific culture. However, in the third volume, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 3, Cassirer argues that both mythical consciousness and our consciousness […]